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2.2.1 Search and matching in the
and Nash bargaining
Non-technical summaryAbstract
This paper studies optimal monetary policy rules in a framework with sticky prices, matching
frictions and real wage rigidities. Optimal monetary policy is given by a constrained Ramsey plan
in which the monetary authority maximizes the agents’ welfare subject to the competitive econ-
omy relations and the assumed monetary policy rule. I ﬁnd that optimal policy should deviate
from the strict inﬂation targeting since the policy maker faces a typical unemployment/inﬂation
trade-oﬀ. In this context and unlike a standard New Keynesian model stabilizing inﬂation is
not suﬃcient to stabilize the marginal cost (hence the output gap) since the latter also depends
on the evolution of unemployment. The matching frictions add a congestion externality since
the number of unemployed in the market and their bargaining power reduce the probability of
forming matches. Hence optimal monetary policy features unemployment targeting along with
inﬂation targeting.
JEL Codes: E52, E24
Keywords: optimal monetary policy rules, matching frictions, wage rigidity.
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November 2006Non-Technical Summary
Nowadays most central banks follow inﬂation targeting or price stability rules with little weight
assigned to output stabilization and almost no attention devoted to other economic indicator such
as unemployment. One common argument for such choice is that stabilizing prices optimizes the
output-inﬂation volatility trade-oﬀ which implies that inﬂation stabilization can be achieved with
a relatively small output cost. Theoretically this hypothesis might be true in models with nominal
rigidities and walrasian labour markets. This paper assesses the importance of targeting output
and unemployment in a model with sticky prices, non-walrasian labour markets and real wage
rigidities.
This paper studies optimal monetary policy rules in a framework with sticky prices, matching
frictions and real wage rigidities. Optimal monet a r yp o l i c yi sg i v e nb yac o n s t r a i n e dR a m s e yp l a n
in which the monetary authority maximizes the agents’ welfare subject to the competitive economy
relations and the assumed monetary policy rule. The economy described is characterized by three
sources of ineﬃciency, both in the long and in the short run. The ﬁrst is monopolistic competition
which induces an ineﬃciently low level of output thereby calling for mild deviations from strict price
stability. The second type of distortion stems form the cost of adjusting prices which reduces output
resources thereby calling for closing the “inﬂation gap”. Finally the search theoretic framework is
characterized by a congestion externality that tends to tighten the labour market. The chance that
workers and ﬁrms have to match depends on the number of unemployed people or vacant ﬁrms
in the market. Whether there is excessive vacancy creation or excessive unemployment depends
on the bargaining power of workers: when the workers’ share of the matching surplus is too small
there will be excessive vacancy creation due to the high proﬁtability of a match for the ﬁrm and
viceversa (see Hosios (1990)). It is in general welfare improving for the monetary authority to
target unemployment and/or vacancies in order to avoid excessive variation of the two.
I ﬁnd that optimal policy should deviate from the strict inﬂation targeting since the policy
maker faces a typical unemployment/inﬂation trade-oﬀ. In this context and unlike a standard New
Keynesian model the ﬂexible price allocation is not optimal due to the search externality. The
matching frictions add a congestion externality since the number of unemployed in the market and
their bargaining power reduce the probability of forming matches. Hence optimal monetary policy
features unemployment targeting along with inﬂation targeting.
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Nowadays most central banks follow inﬂation targeting or price stability rules with little weight
assigned to output stabilization and almost no attention devoted to other economic indicator such
as unemployment. One common argument for such choice is that stabilizing prices optimizes the
output-inﬂation volatility trade-oﬀ which implies that inﬂation stabilization can be achieved with
a relatively small output cost. Theoretically this hypothesis might be true in models with nominal
rigidities and walrasian labour markets. This paper assesses the importance of targeting output
and unemployment in a model with sticky prices, non-walrasian labour markets and real wage
rigidities.
To conduct such an analysis I employ a unitary framework which combines nominal and real
rigidities and which has become common in the recent new Keynesian literature1. More specif-
ically the model economy is characterized by monopolistic competition and adjustment costs on
pricing and matching frictions together with wage rigidity in the labour market. The assumption
of monopolistic competition and adjustment cost on pricing a’ la Rotemberg (1982) is needed to
obtain non-neutral eﬀects of monetary policy and to make a meaningful comparison across diﬀerent
monetary policy regimes. Introducing matching frictions a’ la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) in
the labor market allows to consider frictional unemployment in the steady state and provides a rich
dynamics for the formation and dissolution of employment relations. Finally the reason for intro-
ducing real wage rigidity is twofold. First, several authors have argued that real wage rigidity helps
to recover the typical unemployment-inﬂation trade-oﬀ commonly faced by central banks2. Such
trade-oﬀ, absent in standard new-keynesian models, is an essential feature to determine whether
optimal monetary policy should deviate from full price stabilization. Secondly, some authors have
shown that the introduction of real wage rigidity helps to resolve some inconsistencies between
the standard matching friction model and the empirical evidence; Hall (2003) and Shimer (2003)
noticed that in typical matching friction models unemployment is very sluggish while adjustment
takes place through wages, thereby inducing excessive volatility of the latter3.
1The laboratory economy that I use is very close to the one proposed in Krause and Lubik (2005). Several other
authors, ranging from Walsh (2003) to Christofell and Linzert (2005), have recently introduced matching frictions
and real wage rigidity into new Keynesian models.
2See Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Blanchard and Gali’ (2005) among others.
3Krause and Lubik (2005) have also shown that the introduction of real wage rigidity allows to reproduce the
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 698
November 2006The economy described is characterized by three sources of ineﬃciency, both in the long and
in the short run. The ﬁrst is monopolistic competition which induces an ineﬃciently low level of
output thereby calling for mild deviations from strict price stability4. The second type of distortion
stems form the cost of adjusting prices which reduces output resources thereby calling for closing the
“inﬂation gap”. Finally the search theoretic framework is characterized by a congestion externality
that tends to tighten the labour market. The chance that workers and ﬁrms have to match depends
on the number of unemployed people or vacant ﬁrms in the market. Whether there is excessive
vacancy creation or excessive unemployment depends on the bargaining power of workers: when
the workers’ share of the matching surplus is too small there will be excessive vacancy creation due
to the high proﬁtability of a match for the ﬁrm and viceversa (see Hosios (1990)). It is in general
welfare improving for the monetary authority to target unemployment and/or vacancies in order
to avoid excessive variation of the two.
The recent optimal monetary policy literature has dealt with the role of distortions in alter-
native ways. The vast majority of papers neutralize the steady-state distortions by specifying a
complementary (and arguably unrealistic) role of ﬁscal policy or by choosing speciﬁc parameter
spaces. This assures, even in presence of price stickiness, that the average level of output coincides
(under zero inﬂation) with the eﬃcient one, thereby allowing to neglect the role of stochastic uncer-
tainty on the mean level of those variables5. The approach followed here is based on higher order
approximation of all the conditions that characterize the competitive equilibrium of the economy
and, as in Kollmann (2003a, 2003b) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003, 2004b) and Faia and
Monacelli (2005), allows to study policy rules in a dynamic economy that evolves around a dis-
torted steady-state. Optimal monetary policy in this context is obtained by solving a constrained
Ramsey problem in which the monetary authority maximizes the welfare of agents subject to the
constraints represented by the competitive economy relations and the assumed monetary policy
rule.
I ﬁnd that strict inﬂation targeting is not the optimal policy. In the typical new Keynesian
Beveridge curve otherwise absent from a DSGE model merging new Keynesian elements and matching frictions.
4See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Faia (2005) among others.
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November 2006model stabilizing inﬂation also allows to stabilize the output gap. The latter can also be approxi-
mated by the marginal cost to ﬁrms which in turn equates the inverse of the mark-up; hence price
stability also corresponds to mark-up constancy. In a model with matching frictions and real wage
rigidity the marginal cost also depends on the evolution of unemployment and vacancies, hence
price stability is not suﬃcient to achieve output stabilization. Targeting unemployment allows
to achieve optimality. This is so since by smoothing unemployment the policy maker is able to
stabilize labour market tightness around the steady state value thereby reducing search externality.
Ia l s oﬁnd that there is no welfare gain by targeting wage growth for any degree of inﬂation
targeting. The latter result can be explained again by the fact that the marginal cost in this model
is not equalized to real wages but also depends on the evolution of unemployment, hence stabilizing
wage growth is not suﬃcient to stabilize marginal cost and inﬂation.
The ﬁndings in this paper are consistent with those in Cooley and Quadrini (2004). They study
(unconstrained) Ramsey monetary policy, both under commitment and discretion, in an economy
with matching frictions and limited participation in ﬁnancial market. The monetary transmission
mechanism in their framework is diﬀerent and would typically call for optimality of the Friedman
rule. The addition of matching frictions along with the limited participation renders the optimal
policy pro-cyclical and implies positive money supply growth.
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 comments on the model
dynamics under diﬀerent rules and in response to shocks. Section 4 analyzes optimal policy and
welfare costs of diﬀerent rules. Section 5 concludes. Figures and tables follow.
2 The Model Economy
There is a continuum of agents whose total measure is normalized to one. The economy is popu-
lated by households who consume diﬀerent varieties of goods, save and work. Households save in
both non-state contingent securities and in an insurance fund that allows them to smooth income
ﬂuctuations associated with periods of unemployment. Each agent can indeed be either employed
or unemployed. In the ﬁrst case he receives a wage that is determined according to a Nash bargain-
ing, in the second case he receives an unemployment beneﬁt. The labor market is characterized
by matching frictions and exogenous job separation. The production sector acts as a monopolistic
8
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where c denotes aggregate consumption in ﬁnal goods. Households supply labor hours inelastically
h (which is normalized to 1). Total real labor income is given by wt and is speciﬁed below.
Unemployed households members, ut, receive an unemployment beneﬁt, b. The contract signed
between the worker and the ﬁrm speciﬁes the wage and is obtained through a Nash bargaining
process. In order to ﬁnance consumption at time t each agent also invests in non-state contingent
nominal bonds bt which pay a gross nominal interest rate (1+rn
t ) one period later. As in Andolfatto
(1996) and Merz (1995) it is assumed that workers can insure themselves against earning uncertainty
and unemployment. For this reason the wage earnings have to be interpreted as net of insurance
costs. Finally agents receive proﬁts from the monopolistic sector which they own, Θt, and pay
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t = {s0,....st} denote the history of events up to date t,w h e r est denotes the event realization at date t.
The date 0 probability of observing history s
t is given by ρt. The initial state s
0 is given so that ρ0 =1 . Henceforth,
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Equation (3) is the marginal utility of consumption and equation (4) is the Euler condition with
respect to bonds. Optimality requires that No-Ponzi condition on wealth is also satisﬁed.
2.2 The Production Sector
Firms in the production sector sell their output in a monopolistic competitive market and meet
workers on a matching market. The labor relations are determined according to a standard
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) framework. Workers must be hired from the unemployment pool
and searching for a worker involves a ﬁxed cost. Workers wages are determined through a Nash
decentralized bargaining process which takes place on an individual basis.
2.2.1 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The search for a worker involves a ﬁxed cost κ and the probability of ﬁnding a worker depends on a
constant return to scale matching technology which converts unemployed workers u and vacancies








0 vi,tdi. Deﬁning labor market tightness as θt ≡ vt
ut,t h eﬁrm meets unemployed




t , while the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate
θtq(θt)=mθ
1−ξ
t . If the search process is successful, the ﬁrm in the monopolistic good sector
operates the following technology:
yi,t = ztni,t (6)
where zt is the aggregate productivity shock which follows a ﬁrst order autoregressive process,
ezt = eρzzt−1εz,t, and ni,t is the number of workers hired by each ﬁrm. Matches are destroyed at
an exogenous rate ρ7. We are now in the position to determine the law of motion for the workers
7The alternative assumption of endogenous job destruction would induce, consistently with empirical observations,
additional persistence to the model as shown in denHaan, Ramsey and Watson (2000). However due to the normative
focus of this paper I choose the more simple assumption of exogenous job destruction. This greatly reduces the
complexity of the numerical solution to the optimal policy problem without altering the results compared to the
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November 2006employed and the ones seeking for a job. Labor force is normalized to unity. The number of
employed people at time t in each ﬁrm i is given by the number of employed people at time t − 1
plus the ﬂow of new matches concluded in period t − 1 who did not discontinue the match:
ni,t =( 1− ρ)(ni,t−1 + vi,t−1q(θi,t−1)) (7)
Unemployment is given by total labor force minus the number of employed workers:
ut =1− nt (8)






Firms in the monopolistic sector use labor to produce diﬀerent varieties of consumption good and
face a quadratic cost of adjusting prices. Hours worked and wages are determined through the bar-
gaining problem analyzed in the next section. Here we develop the dynamic optimization decision
of ﬁrms choosing prices, pi
h,t, number of employees, ni,t, number of vacancies, vi,t, to maximize the







































yt = ztni,t (11)












t represent the cost of adjusting prices, ψ can be thought as the sluggishness
in the price adjustment process, κ as the cost of posting vacancies and wt denotes the fact that the
bargained wage might depend on time varying factors. Let’s deﬁne mct, the lagrange multiplier
on constraint (11), as the marginal cost of ﬁrms and µt, the lagrange multiplier on constraint (12),
as the marginal value of one worker. Since all ﬁrms will chose in equilibrium the same price and
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problem read as follows:
• nt :
µt = mctzt − wt + βEt(
λt+1
λt







)((1 − ρ)µt+1) (14)
• pt :






]=( 1− mct)ε (15)









As already noticed in Krause and Lubik (2005) in a matching model the marginal cost of ﬁrms
is not only given by the marginal productivity of each single employee, wt
zt , as it is in a standard
walrasian model but contains an extra component,
µt− κ
q(θt)
zt ,which depends on the future value of
each employee. Since posting vacancy is costly a successful match today is valuable also since
reduces future search costs.
2.2.3 Bellman Equations, Wage Setting and Nash Bargaining
The wage schedule is obtained through the solution to an individual Nash bargaining process. To
solve for it we need ﬁrst to derive the marginal values of a match for both, ﬁrms and workers.
Those values will indeed enter the sharing rule of the bargaining process. Let’s denote by V J
t the
marginal discounted value of a match for a ﬁrm:
V J
t = mctzt − wt + Et{(β
λt+1
λt
)[(1 − ρ)V J
t+1]} (17)
The marginal value of a match depends on real revenues minus the real wage plus the dis-
counted continuation value. With probability (1−ρ) the job remains ﬁlled and earns the expected
12
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November 2006value and with probability, ρ, the job is destroyed and has zero value. Using the equation (16) we








)[(1 − ρ)V J
t+1]} (18)
Since the value of a match for the ﬁrm must be zero in equilibrium the following zero proﬁt






)[(1 − ρ)V J
t+1]} (19)
Equation (19) is an arbitrage condition for the posting of new vacancies. It implies that in
equilibrium the cost of posting a vacancy must equate the discounted expected return from posting





t =[ wt + Et{(β
λt+1
λt
)[(1 − ρ)V E
t+1 + ρV U
t+1]} (20)
V U
t =[ b + Et{(β
λt+1
λt
)[θtq(θt)(1 − ρ)V E
t+1 +( 1− θtq(θt)(1 − ρ))V U
t+1]} (21)
where b denotes real unemployment beneﬁts.
Workers and ﬁrms are engaged in a Nash bargaining process to determine wages. The optimal
sharing rule of the standard Nash bargaining is given:
(V E






After substituting the previously deﬁned value functions it is possible derive the following wage
schedule:
wt = ς(mctzt + θtκ)+( 1− ς)b (23)
Real wage rigidity. Shimer (2003), Hall (2003) noticed that in a matching model a’ la
Mortensen and Pissarides wages are too volatile since little adjustment takes place along the em-
ployment margin. They also noticed that the introduction of real wage rigidity helps to resolve
some of the puzzling features of the standard matching model. Thereby following Hall (2003) I
assume that the individual real wage is a weighted average of the one obtained through the Nash
13
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wt = λ[ς(mctzt + θtκ)+( 1− ς)b]+( 1− λ)w (24)
2.3 Monetary Policy






























The class of rules considered features deviations of each variable form the target. The output
gap is given by the deviation of output from potential output y∗, where the latter is given by the
steady state solution to the unconstrained Ramsey problem9. Notice that this general speciﬁcation
allows for a reaction of the monetary policy instrument to deviations of unemployment from its
steady state value. The monetary authority sets optimal policy by solving a constrained Ramsey
problem. Indeed the monetary authority maximizes the welfare of agents subject to the constraints
represented by the competitive economy relations and the monetary policy rule represented by
(25). Numerically10 I will search for the speciﬁcation
©
φπ,φ y,φ u,φ r
ª
that maximizes household’s
welfare and I will evaluate the relative welfare of a series of alternative simple Taylor-type rules
which impose alternative restrictions on (25)11.
8Notice that the results in this paper remain valid when the wage is set as a weighted average of current and past
values.
9See Faia (2006) for a global solution of the unconstrained Ramsey plan with labor market frictions.
10Is o l v et h em o d e lb yc o m p u t i n gasecond order approximation of the policy functions around the non-stochastic
distorted steady state. The distortions that characterize the steady state are monopolistic competition along with a
non-walrasian labor market.
11See also Kim and Kim (2003), Kim and Levin (2004), Kollmann (2003a, 2003b), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003,
2004b), Faia and Monacelli (2005) for a similar approach.
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Aggregate output is obtained by aggregating production of individual ﬁrms and by subtracting the
resources wasted into the search activity and the cost of adjusting prices:












I also assume that there is exogenous government expenditure ﬁnanced through lump sum taxation.
Hence the resource constraint reads as follows:
yt = ct + gt (27)
Furthermore I assume zero total net supply of bonds.
2.5 Calibration
Preferences. Time is measured in quarters. I set the discount factor β =0 .99, so that the annual
interest rate is equal to 4 percent. The parameter on consumption in the utility function is set
equal to 2.
Production. Following Basu and Fernald (1997) I set the value added mark-up of prices over
marginal cost to 0.2. This generates a value for the price elasticity of demand, ε, of 6. Is e tt h ec o s t
of adjusting prices ψ =5 0so as to generate a slope of the log-linear Phillips curve consistent with
empirical and theoretical studies.
Labor market frictions parameters. The matching technology is a homogenous of degree
one function and is characterized by the parameter ξ. Consistently with estimates by Blanchard
and Diamond (1989) I set this parameter to 0.4. I set the steady state ﬁrm matching rate, q(θ), to
0.7 which is the value used by denHaan, Ramsey and Watson (1997). The probability for a worker
of ﬁnding a job, θq(θ), is set equal to 0.6, which implies an average duration of unemployment
of 1.67 as reported ion Cole and Rogerson (1996). With those values it is possible to determine
the number of vacancies as well as the vacancy/unemployment ratio. The exogenous separation
probability, ρ,i ss e tt o0.08 consistently with estimates from Hall (1995) and Davis et al. (1996);
this value is also compatible with those used in the literature which range from 0.7 (Merz (1995)) to
0.15 (Andolfatto (1996)). The degree of wage rigidity, λ, is set equal to 0.6 and is compatible with
15
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November 2006estimates from Smets and Wouters (2003). The value for b is set so as to generate a steady state
ratio, b
w, of 0.5 which corresponds to the average value observed for industrialized countries (see
Nickell and Nunziata (2001)). The steady state scale paramter, m, is obtained using the observation
that steady state number of matches is given by
ρ
1−ρ(1−u). The bargaining power of workers, ς,is
set to 0.5 as in most papers in the literature, while the value for the cost of posting vacancies is
obtained from the steady state version of labour market tightness evolution.
Exogenous shocks and monetary policy: The process for the aggregate productivity
shock, zt, follows an AR(1) and based on the RBC literature is calibrated so that its standard
deviations is set to 0.008 and its persistence to 0.95. Log-government consumption evolves according












t, where the steady-state share of
government consumption, g, is set so that
g
y =0 .25 and ε
g
t is an i.i.d. shock with standard deviation
σg. Empirical evidence for the US in Perotti (2004) suggests σg =0 .008 and ρg =0 .9.F o l l o w i n g
several empirical studies for US and Europe (see Clarida, Gali’ and Gertler (2000), Angeloni and
Dedola (1998) and Andres, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2001) among others) I set the baseline value
for the interest rate smoothing parameter, χ, equal to 0.9.
3 Dynamic Properties of the Model Under Diﬀerent Monetary
Policy Rules
Before turning to the welfare implications of the various monetary policy regime it is instructive
to consider the dynamic properties of the model under diﬀerent monetary policy rules. In what
follows I will comment the impulse response of several variables under productivity and government
expenditure shocks and consider the set of rules speciﬁed in table (1).
Productivity shocks. Figure (1) shows impulse responses of various variables to a raise
in aggregate productivity. Output raises and inﬂation falls. As ﬁrms increase production, they
also increase vacancies and the labour market tightens. As a consequence real wages increase and
unemployment falls. The latter variable moves in the opposite direction with respect to vacancies
thereby reproducing the Beveridge curve.
In comparing the diﬀerent monetary regimes we notice that strict inﬂation targeting has a
strong stabilizing eﬀect on inﬂation but tends to destabilize labour market variables, while Taylor
16
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lize both the labor market and inﬂation hence it behaves at best in managing the unemploy-
ment/inﬂation stabilization trade-oﬀ. Additionally it must be noticed that the third rule consid-
ered adds persistence to all variables and induces overshooting of inﬂation above the steady state.
The latter property indicates the ability for the policy maker under this rule of inﬂuencing future
expectations of inﬂation.
It is interesting to notice that targeting output along with inﬂation tends to stabilize labour
market variables in the long run more than targeting unemployment. This is due to the nature
of the externalities that characterize the labour market in this environment and to the type of
shock considered. When the monetary authority targets unemployment, the latter falls less on
impact thereby tightening more the labour market. The high congestion eﬀect observed in this
case tends to reduce unemployment in the long run more than under the output targeting. On
the other side the productivity shock increases the proﬁtability of a match for the ﬁrm thereby
encouraging vacancy creation. When the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule, it tends to
stabilize production, hence both unemployment and vacancies in the long run and in the short run.
Government expenditure shocks. Figure (2) shows impulse responses of various variables
to a government expenditure shocks, which is used to discuss the eﬀects of a demand shock. Due
to the increase in demand output and inﬂation rise. To meet the increased demand ﬁrms increase
vacancies thereby increasing labour market tightness and real wages.
Once again strict inﬂation targeting tends to destabilize labour market variables and to smooth
inﬂation dynamic. On the opposite side stands the Taylor rule. And again targeting unemployment
along with inﬂation helps to stabilize both inﬂation and labor market variables.
4W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
As speciﬁed above the optimal policy problem in this context is solved by assuming that the
monetary authority maximizes households welfare subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions
and the monetary policy rule represented by (25). Speciﬁcally I search for parametrization of
interest rate rules that satisfy the following 3 conditions: a) they are simple since they involve only
observable variables, b) they guarantee uniqueness of the rational expectation equilibrium, c) they
17
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class of rule based on the condition a), then I identify a grid search of parameters based on criterion
b), ﬁnally I search for the parametrization that maximize agents’ utility.
Some observations on the computation of welfare in this context are in order. First, one
c a n n o ts a f e l yr e l yo ns t a n d a r dﬁrst order approximation methods to compare the relative welfare
associated to each monetary policy arrangement. Indeed in an economy with a distorted steady
state stochastic volatility aﬀects both ﬁrst and second moments of those variables that are critical
for welfare. Since in a ﬁrst order approximation of the model’s solution the expected value of a
variable coincides with its non-stochastic steady state, the eﬀects of volatility on the variables’
mean values is by construction neglected. Hence policy arrangements can be correctly ranked only
by resorting to a higher order approximation of the policy functions.12 Additionally one needs
to focus on the conditional expected discounted utility of the representative agent. This allows
to account for the transitional eﬀects from the deterministic to the diﬀerent stochastic steady
states respectively implied by each alternative policy rule.13Deﬁne Ω as the fraction of household’s
consumption that would be needed to equate conditional welfare W0 under a generic interest rate









Under a given speciﬁcation of utility one can solve for Ω and obtain:
Ω =e x p
n³





4.1 Optimal Monetary Policy Rule
I simulate the model economy under the two sources of aggregate uncertainty, productivity and
government consumption shocks. I then conduct two experiments. First, I compute welfare under
diﬀerent (ad hoc) speciﬁcations of the monetary policy rule. The rules are the following:
12See Kim and Kim (2003) for an analysis of the inaccuracy of welfare calculations based on log-linear approxima-
tions in dynamic open economies.
13See Kim and Levin (2004) for a detailed analysis on this point.
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(ii) Simple Taylor rule with smoothing,w i t hφπ =1 .5 and φy =0 .5,φ u =0 ,φ r =0 .9;
(iii) Strict inﬂation targeting, φπ =3 ,φ y = φu = φr =0 ;
(iv) Inﬂation + unemployment targeting,w i t hφπ =1 .5, φu =0 .5, φy = φr =0 ;
(v) Strong inﬂation + unemployment targeting,w i t hφπ =3 , φu =0 .5, φy =0 ,φ r =0 ;
(vi) Inﬂation + wage growth targeting, with φπ =3 , φu =0 , φy = φr =0 ,φ w =0 .5,where φw
indicates the parameter on wage growth.
Secondly, I search in the grid of parameters
©
φπ,φ y,φ u,φ r
ª
for the rule which delivers the
highest level of welfare, which is deﬁned as the optimal policy rule.14
The choice of including unemployment as an independent argument comes from the consider-
ation that most central banks face a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment stabilization.
In this respect it is natural to ask whether the price stability objective so much professed lately
c a nb er e a l l yc o n s i d e r e dt h eo p t i m a lp o l i c y .
Table (2) summarizes the ﬁndings and reports the values of the parameter which maximize
conditional welfare, as well as the welfare loss Ω (relative to the optimal policy) of alternative
simple rules.
Results are as follows. First, among the simple rules targeting unemployment along with
inﬂation is the optimal rule. The reason for this is simple. In standard new-keynesian models
mark-up constancy, hence marginal cost stabilization allows to achieve also inﬂation stabilization.
On the contrary in a model with matching frictions the dynamic of marginal cost also depend on the
evolution of unemployment. In this context it is not possible to obtain inﬂation stabilization without
targeting unemployment as well. By smoothing unemployment ﬂuctuations the monetary authority
can reduce the congestion eﬀect typically associated with matching frictions thereby maximizing
welfare. In addition it must be noticed that optimality requires targeting unemployment along with
an aggressive inﬂation stabilization.
Secondly, targeting output along with inﬂation is welfare detrimental. This result is consis-
tent with the one obtained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) in a model economy with capital
14T h es e a r c hi sm a d eo v e rt h ef o l l o w i n gr a n g e s :[0,4] for φπ, [0,0.5] for φu, [0,1] for φy. I also compare rules with
interest rate smoothing (φr =0 .9) to rules without smoothing (φr =0 ) . It is judged as admissible a combination of
policy parameters that delivered a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
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which targeting output gaps is welfare detrimental is due to the fact that the policy maker aims
at targeting only gaps which signal an ineﬃciency. In this case since the friction aﬀects only the
labor market targeting the unemployment gap provides the right target.
Third interest smoothing is always welfare enhancing. Also this result is consistent with the
one obtained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and can be explained with the fact that interest
rate smoothing allows to protract the stabilization eﬀects of the monetary policy targets.
Finally targeting wage growth is welfare detrimental. The latter result can be explained again
by the fact that the marginal cost in this model is not equalized to real wages but depends also on
the evolution of unemployment, hence stabilizing wage growth is not suﬃcient to stabilize marginal
cost and inﬂation. On the contrary by targeting unemployment the policy maker is able to close
the whole marginal cost gap hence the whole inﬂation gap.
4.2 Responding to Unemployment and Wages
To further investigate whether the response to unemployment in a Taylor rule helps to increase
welfare, ﬁgure (3) reports the eﬀects on conditional welfare of varying both the inﬂation and the
unemployment coeﬃcients on the monetary policy rule. It shows that increasing the weight on
unemployment signiﬁcantly improves welfare and that the maximum utility is reached under strong
inﬂation targeting together with unemployment targeting.
This result is in contrast with optimal policy prescriptions obtained by the vast majority of
papers which employed a new keynesian framework (whose relevant frictions are price rigidity and
monopolistic competition). As stressed in Blanchard and Gali’ (2005) the new keynesian framework
is characterized by a “divine coincidence” for which stabilizing inﬂation implies invariably output
stabilization. They showed that by introducing labor market rigidities in the form of exogenously
imposed wage rigidities allows to beak this divine coincidence and to revive the unemployment
inﬂation trade-oﬀ. In the context of the present paper the sole presence of search frictions produce
an ineﬃciently low level of employment and this introduces a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and em-
ployment/output stabilization. In presence of such trade-oﬀ the monetary authority should strike
a balance between reducing the cost of adjusting prices and increasing employment.
Figure (4) reports the eﬀects on conditional welfare of varying coeﬃcients in the monetary
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does not improve welfare for any value of the parameter on inﬂation. The result is conﬁrmed also
under a high degree of real wage stickiness (λ =0 .9), s e e( 5 ) .N o t i c et h a tt h i ss e e m si nc o n t r a s t
with results previously obtained in the literature. More speciﬁcally, Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2005) ﬁnd that it is
optimal to target wage inﬂation. The diﬀerence between this paper result and the previous ones
can be explained by the following considerations. First, previous authors were considering nominal
wage growth targeting (wage inﬂation targeting) while here I consider real wage growth. Secondly,
previous literature had introduced labor market frictions only in then form of nominal wage rigidity
a’ la Calvo while I also consider a non-walrasian labor market.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper derives a constrained Ramsey policy in a model with monopolistic competition and
sticky prices, matching frictions and real wage rigidity in the labour market. Further it compares
welfare under diﬀerent monetary policy rules. It concludes that the introduction of labor market
rigidities implies that the optimal rule must deviate from strict inﬂation targeting. This is so since
the matching frictions add a congestion externality due to which the number of unemployed in the
market and their bargaining power reduces the probability of forming matches. The marginal cost
in this case depends also on the evolution of unemployment. This induces a typical unemploy-
ment/inﬂation trade-oﬀ that calls for unemployment targeting along with inﬂation targeting.
15It is worth noticing that the determinacy region under wage growth targeting shrinks compared to the case of
unemployment targeting. It is not surprising to observe indeterminacy for some parameters’ regions in models with
matching frictions. Indeed as it has been observed in Krause and Lubik (2005) and Hashimzade and Ortigueira
(2005) the presence of search externality tends to produce indeterminacy.
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Type of rule φπ φy φu φr
Strict inﬂation targeting 1.5 0 0 0
Taylor rule 1.5 0.5 0 0
Targeting unemployment 1.5 0 0.5 0
Table 2: Welfare comparison of alternative monetary policy rules.
Rule % Loss relative to optimal rule
Taylor rule 2.9778
Taylor rule with smoothing 0.3420
Strict inﬂation targeting 0.0077
Inﬂation + unemployment targeting 0.0340
Strong Inﬂation + unemployment targeting 0
Inﬂation + wage growth targeting 0.1388
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to government expenditure shocks under the three rules
d e s c r i b e di nt a b l e( 1 ) .
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